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Marcin Grabowski
MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND ASIA 
AND ECONOMIC CRISES
The main goal of this paper is to analyze monetary integration in Europe 
and East Asia in the context of economic crises, namely the Asian Eco-
nomic Crisis of 1997/1998 and the current economic crisis in the world, 
especially in the Euro zone, based on the Optimum Currency Area theory 
created by Robert Mundell in 1961. While following the media, one may 
notice that financial and monetary integration may be the basic source 
of the persistent crisis in Europe, and that our continent is deadlocked 
by the common currency, the EURO. In the aforementioned context, fi-
nancial and monetary integration in East Asia seems definitely a bad idea. 
What is surprising is that East Asia has been integrating since the Asian 
Economic Crisis, which is somehow unexpected, bearing in mind that eco-
nomic crises usually lead to strong protectionist resentments.
Robert Mundell’s theory of the Optimum Currency Area will be used 
as a scheme for analysis. Based on the aforementioned theory, financial 
and monetary integration will be briefly analyzed in the European Un-
ion, specifically in the first Euro zone countries (the first 12 members 
of the monetary union, as they seem crucial in the process of the crea-
tion of the monetary union, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain). Special attention will be given to core Euro zone countries, 
specifically countries influencing economic indicators stronger than 
the others (by having a larger share of the European Gross Region-
al Products – one can focus on Germany and France here, Germany, 
France and Italy, or Germany, France, Italy and Spain). We will focus on 
the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–1998, and attempt to trace its causes 
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and effects, including its influence on the further financial and monetary 
integration of East Asia. Thirteen East Asian countries will be analyzed 
in the context of the Optimum Currency Area criteria, namely ASEAN 
Plus Three countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, plus 
China (PRC), Japan and South Korea). Finally, we will attempt to an-
swer whether it is possible to create an Asian Monetary Area and who 
would benefit from it, basing our analysis on the Optimum Currency 
Area theory and the European Monetary Area crisis, including actors 
that make profits on the European monetary integration and those that 
lose in the process, while also looking for sources of the crisis.
OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA
The theory of the so-called Optimum Currency Area was first introduced 
by Robert Mundell, a Canadian economist and winner of the Nobel Prize 
in 1999, currently a professor at Columbia University in New York. In his 
article “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas” published in The American 
Economic Review,1 he aimed at easing the problems caused by periodic 
balance-of-payments crises, occurring periodically in the fixed exchange 
rates system, arguing against a system of national currencies connected 
by flexible exchange rates. Robert Mundell refers to flexible exchange 
rates (not very common in 19612), defining them on the basis of the fol-
lowing conditions:
1 Robert Mundell, “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” The American Economic Review, 
51 (4), 1961.
2 The Bretton Woods System was the very first fully negotiated monetary system, created at 
the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944. It existed till 1971, when Richard Nixon terminat-
ed the convertibility of the US dollar into gold. The system was supposed to combine the advan-
tages of the gold standard (providing exchange rate stability) with the advantages of floating rates 
(important for pursuing national employment policies). The system aimed at avoiding the defects 
of floating rates (speculation, competitive devaluation) and defects of a fixed exchange rate gold 
standard. Therefore, a peg system of fixed parities was created, subjected to change only in the case 
of fundamental disequilibrium. See Michael Bordo “The Bretton Woods International Monetary Sys-
tem: A Historical Overview,” in: Michael Bordo and Barry Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective on 
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1) Dynamic stability of the international price system based on flexible 
exchange rates (considering speculative demands);
2) Changes in exchange rates, needed for elimination of normal distur-
bances to dynamic equilibrium do not cause shifts between export 
and import-competing industries;
3) The risks generated by flexible exchange rates may be covered 
in the forward markets at reasonable costs; 
4) Central banks will avoid monopolistic speculation;
5) Monetary discipline will be maintained by the unfavorable political 
consequences of continuing depreciation;
6) Reasonable protection of debtors and creditors should be provided 
in order to maintain a long-term capital movement;
7) Wages and profits do not reflect the price index, impacted heavily 
by imported goods.3
The second issue discussed in the article seems even more important. 
According to Mundell, an optimum currency area can be a region with 
internal factor mobility and external factor immobility. Therefore, we 
should expect at least labor and capital mobility within the area, hence 
we should expect a relatively equal level of unemployment and inflation 
rates in the area subjected to monetary integration.4
What is interesting is that Mundell’s theory, expressed in the aforemen-
tioned text, can be perceived as anti-common currency, since according 
to “A Theory of Optimum Currency Area,” optimum currency areas should 
be rather smaller than larger. Surprisingly, since 1970, Mundell himself has 
supported European efforts to create a common currency area. This paradox 
can be explained on the basis of two of Mundell’s later works, in which he 
argues that in the case of proper management of common currency (if pur-
chasing power remains stable) larger currency areas are better, even encom-
passing diverse regions or nations subject to “asymmetric shocks.”5
the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1993, pp. 4–5. Actually, the system should be analyzed as a fixed exchange rates system. 
Hence, analysis of flexible exchange rates seems exceptional at that time.
3 Robert Mundell, op. cit. 1961.
4 Ibidem.
5 The works of Robert Mundell supporting a different approach were presented during a con-
ference in 1970, and published in 1973. They were: “Uncommon Arguments for Common Cur-
rencies,” in H.G. Johnson and A.K. Swoboda, The Economics of Common Currencies, Allen and 
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The most important criterion for an optimum currency area, according 
to Mundell, is the level of production factors mobility, according to Mc-
Kinnon, level of openness of the economy or, according to Grubel, its di-
versification.6 The basic problem in the Optimum Currency Area should 
be prevention of the so-called asymmetric shocks (stemming from uneven 
phases of the economic cycle), when certain countries (areas) cannot apply 
monetary policy tools (e.g. lowering interest rates). Other adaptation mecha-
nisms should be applied in the case of such a disturbance, including labor 
force flows (in the case of full mobility), change of prices and wages in order 
to stabilize global demand (difficult in countries with strong labor unions – 
as is the case in Europe), or fiscal transfers (difficult for political reasons, 
such as transfers from Germany to Greece). Therefore, common currencies 
should be adapted by regions that have a convergence of economic cycles.7 
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND CONVERGENCE 
CRITERIA
Having in mind full economic integration and responding to the change 
in the world monetary system (after the ‘fall’ of Bretton Woods), the Eu-
ropean Community began monetary integration in the late 1970s,8 creating 
the European Monetary System in 1979. A crucial element of the system 
was an Exchange Rate Mechanism allowing fluctuations up and down 
Unwin, 1973, pp. 114–32, and “A Plan for a European Currency,” in H.G. Johnson and A.K. Swo-
boda, The Economics of Common Currencies, Allen and Unwin, 1973, pp. 143–72 (quoted in Ronald 
McKinnon, Mundell, the Euro, and Optimum Currency Areas, 2000, http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/
workp/swp00009.pdf Web. Nov. 30, 2012.
6 Franciszek Adamczyk, “Teoria i praktyka międzynarodowej integracji gospodarczej,” in: Jan 
Rymarczyk (ed.), Międzynarodowe stosunki gospodarcze. Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Eko-
nomiczne, 2006, p. 306.
7 Ibidem, pp. 302–305.
8 Earlier attempts, such as the Werner Plan of 1970, were unsuccessful due to the fall of the Bret-
ton Woods System in 1973. See: Report to the Council and the Commission on the Realization 
by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community, Luxembourg, 8 October 1970, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapter5/19701008en72realis
ationbystage.pdf Web. Nov. 20, 2012.
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of up to 2.25% (with exceptions for some countries of as much as ±6% and 
certain capital flow restrictions, even in large economies such as France). 
A margin for fluctuations was enlarged in 1993 (to ±15%) in the aftermath 
of speculating attacks on European currencies.9
As a result of the need for economic convergence in order to avoid 
asymmetric shocks, so-called convergence criteria were created. Even 
if it has been disputed whether we can call the Maastricht criteria conver-
gence criteria,10 there is no doubt that adherence to these could stabilize 
European economies and limit the negative ramifications of the afore-
mentioned asymmetric shocks in the case of lacking or limited adaptation 
mechanisms (labor force mobility or transfers). 
These criteria refer to four areas grouped by the European Central Bank 
as follows: price developments, fiscal developments, exchange rate devel-
opments, and long-term interest rate developments.
Concerning price developments, an average rate of inflation should 
not exceed by more than 1.5% the three best performing Member States 
in terms of price stability.11 In reference to exchange rate developments, 
a country applying to the Euro-Zone should follow the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II (ERM II) for two years before examination.12 As for 
 9 Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, Marc Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 
Boston: Adison-Wesley, 2012, pp. 560–561. For detailed information on the various stages of the Eu-
ropean monetary integration, see i.a.: Leokadia Oręziak, 1999, “Unia Gospodarcza i Walutowa,” 
in: Lucjan Ciamaga, Ewa Latoszek, Krystyna Michałowska-Gorywoda, Leokadia Oręziak, Eufemia 
Teichmann, Unia Europejska. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
10 Panos Afxentiou, “Convergence, the Maastricht Criteria, and Their Benefits,” The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs, VII (1), 2000.
11 The application of treaty provisions is as follows: “With regard to ‘an average rate of infla-
tion, observed over a period of one year before the examination,’ the inflation rate is calculated using 
the change in the latest available 12-month average of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) over the previous 12-month average. The notion of ‘at most, the three best performing Mem-
ber States in terms of price stability,’ which is used for the definition of the reference value, is ap-
plied by taking the unweighted arithmetic average of the rate of inflation in the three countries with 
the lowest inflation rates, unless there are outliers. Price developments in a country can be judged 
to be an outlier if its inflation rate is significantly lower than those of the other Member States 
owing to the accumulation of country-specific factors (see the ECB’s 2010 Convergence Report for 
more details)”, European Central Bank, Convergence Criteria, 2012, http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/
escb/html/convergence-criteria.en.html Web. Nov. 20, 2012.
12 In this case the application of treaty provisions is as follows: “First, the ECB assesses wheth-
er the country has participated in ERM II ‘for at least the last two years before the examination,’ 
as stated in the Protocol (No 13). Second, the examination of exchange rate stability against the euro 
focuses on the exchange rate being close to the central rate in ERM II, while also taking into account 
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the long-term interest rate developments, member states’ interest rates 
should not exceed by more than 2 percent the three best performing coun-
tries. Long-term interest rates should be measured in reference to long-
term government bonds.13 In terms of fiscal developments, public deficit 
of no more than 3% of GDP and public debt of no more than 60% of GDP 
should be maintained.14 
The first three criteria should ensure monetary stability, while the last 
should prevent from over exceeding inflation that could stem from budget 
deficits.15 Some scholars perceive especially this last criterion as an ex-
ample of monetary orthodoxy, questioning its usefulness.16 One should 
also bear in mind the existence of natural feedback between the intensity 
factors that may have led to an appreciation, which is in line with the approach taken in the past. 
In this respect, the width of the fluctuation band within ERM II does not prejudice the examination 
of the exchange rate stability criterion. Third, the issue of the absence of ‘severe tensions’ is gener-
ally addressed by examining the extent to which exchange rates deviate from the central rates against 
the euro in ERM II. This is done by using indicators such as exchange rate volatility against the euro, 
as well as short-term interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the euro area and their evolution, and also 
by considering the role played by foreign exchange interventions and international financial assis-
tance programmes in stabilising the currency,” ibidem.
13 In this criterion, the application of treaty provisions is as follows: “First, with regard to ‘an av-
erage nominal long-term interest rate’ observed over ‘a period of one year before the examination,’ 
the long-term interest rate is calculated as an arithmetic average over the latest 12-month period for 
which HICP data are available. Second, the notion of ‘at most, the three best performing Member 
States in terms of price stability,’ which is used for the definition of the reference value, is applied 
by using the unweighted arithmetic average of the long-term interest rates of the same three Member 
States used for the calculation of the reference value for the criterion on price stability. Interest rates 
are measured on the basis of harmonised long-term interest rates, which were developed for the pur-
pose of assessing convergence,” ibidem.
14 ECB refers to treaty provisions: “The second indent of Article 140(1) of the Treaty requires: 
‘the sustainability of the government financial position; this will be apparent from having achieved 
a government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive as determined in accordance with 
Article 126(6).’ Article 126 sets out the excessive deficit procedure. According to Article 126(2) 
and (3), the European Commission prepares a report if an EU Member State does not fulfill the re-
quirements for fiscal discipline, in particular if: (1) the ratio of the planned or actual government 
deficit to GDP exceeds a reference value (defined in the Protocol on the excessive deficit proce-
dure as 3% of GDP), unless either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached 
a level that comes close to the reference value, or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value 
is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value; (2) the ratio 
of government debt to GDP exceeds a reference value (defined in the Protocol on the excessive defi-
cit procedure as 60% of GDP), unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the refer-
ence value at a satisfactory pace,” ibidem.
15 Panos Afxentiou, op.cit.
16 Nicolas Jabko, The Political Vision behind the Regional Currency, in: Bertrand Fort, Paths 
to Regionalisation: Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe, Singapore: Marshall Caven-
dish Academic, 2005, pp. 48–50.
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of trade and other economic relations, and the correlation of economic cy-
cles. Therefore, artificial criteria may play a supportive role for monetary 
integration.17
We should not forget about one additional factor, namely the real sec-
toral interests of either branches (such as pro-export industries) or certain 
countries benefiting from more fixed exchange rates. Generally, countries 
with hard currencies, especially Germany and Benelux countries, should 
17 Jeffrey Frankel, Andrew Rose, “The Endogeneity of Optimum Currency Area Criteria,” 
The Economic Journal, 108, 1998.
Table 1. Average annual percentage depreciation against DM
1973–1978 1979–1983 1984–1989 1990–1994
Hard currencies
Netherlands 1.14 0.77 0.01 –0.13
Belgium 2.36 4.24 1.01 –0.48
Denmark 4.59 4.37 1.71 0.16
Intermediate currencies
France 6.53 5.02 2.31 0.01
Ireland 12.9 12.90 3.49 1.96
Soft currencies
United Kingdom 12.9 0.89 6.68 2.57
Italy 17.28 5.26 4.08 6.21
Spain 12.35 6.54 3.51 5.16
Greece 13.24 13.02 18.74 10.23
Portugal 20.83 14.16 10.64 2.88
Non-EU Members
Austria 0.12 –0.71 –0.12 0.19
Norway 4.92 1.08 6.61 2.29
Finland 8.83 –0.32 3.06 6.83
Sweden 8.41 3.83 5.35 6.18
AVERAGE 9.03 4.37 4.79 3.15
Source: Jeffry Frieden, “Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and 
European Monetary Integration,” International Organization, 56 (4), 2002, p. 836.
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benefit more from monetary integration than countries that have tended 
to depreciate their currencies in order to increase the competitiveness 
of their economies (southern countries). An analysis of this kind was pre-
pared by Jeffry Frieden in his article “Real Sources of European Currency 
Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration,” published 
in International Organization in 2002.18 Table 1 depicts the average annu-
al percentage depreciation of nominal exchange rates against the German 
Mark (Deutsch Mark DM). 
Fixed exchange rates deprived governments of “southern countries,” 
this tool being one of the reasons for the current economic crisis. But it was 
also the source of success for German exports, as it was not only competi-
tive within the EU (due to the aforementioned fixed exchange rates or sim-
ply common currency), but also more competitive since the EURO was 
weaker (encompassing a “set of currencies”) than the German Mark. 
18 Jeffry Frieden, “Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European 
























Chart 1. Share of countries in Gross Regional Product (EURO-12)
Source: The author’s own research based on data from CIA World Factbook 2012, 
at: www.cia.gov
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Table 2. Export as percentage of GDP and export growth 1999–2011 (EURO-12)
Country Name 1999 2005 2011
Export growth
1999–2011
Euro area (27) 32.9 38.0 43.6 132%
European Union 32.4 37.0 42.5 131%
Austria 42.1 53.8 57.3 136%
Belgium 70.0 78.7 84.3 121%
Finland 38.8 41.8 40.7 105%
France 26.4 26.4 27.0 102%
Germany 29.4 41.3 50.2 171%
Greece 22.5 23.2 25.1 111%
Ireland 89.2 81.1 106.6 119%
Italy 24.3 25.9 28.8 119%
Luxembourg 134.3 155.8 176.5 131%
Netherlands 63.0 69.6 83.0 132%
Portugal 27.1 27.7 35.5 131%
Spain 26.7 25.7 30.3 113%




























































Chart 2. Export growth 1999–2011, EURO-12
Source: The author’s own work and calculations based on the World Databank, World 
Bank 2012
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Chart 1 presents the relative size of German and French economies 
within the EURO-12 (the first 12 Euro member countries from 2002 were 
analyzed), in order to show their relative strength in shaping the ECB 
monetary policy. Generally, if ECB adjusted to the shape of the European 
economy, or Euro-Zone economy, it would be 48% based on Germany 
and France, hence there are few chances of adjusting the monetary policy 
to smaller and weaker economies. Therefore, other adaptation mechanisms 
should be applied (such as fiscal transfers).
Table 2 and Chart 2 show the percentage share of export in GDP 
of EURO-12 countries, although the European Union and all Euro coun-
tries are included as a comparative perspective. There is no doubt that 
Germany is the country which has benefited the most from the intro-
duction of the Euro (the growth of German export in the last twelve 
years exceeds 70%), followed by other “hard currency” countries such 
as Austria, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. What is surprising is that 
there is not much statistical difference between the Euro area and the Eu-
ropean Union as a whole (32% and 31%). Therefore, we may say that 
the competitive advantage of the first Euro countries has not grown 
thanks to the introduction of the Euro, whereas the competitive advan-
tage of strong-currency countries has increased significantly, with Ger-
many in the lead. 
Finally, Table 3 refers to convergence criteria in the EURO-12 coun-
tries in 2011, the next crisis year. We can observe that the annual infla-
tion in these countries is generally acceptable (partly due to the crisis), 
while other factors show the scale of problems. It is visible, while looking 
at interest rates (commercial banks’ prime lending rates are depicted),19 
especially in the case of PIIGS20 countries. An even more frightening pic-
ture appears in the case of fiscal deficits (there are only four countries 
which fulfill this criterion: Austria, Finland, Germany and Luxembourg) 
and public debt (there are only two small countries which fulfill this crite-
rion, namely Finland and Luxembourg), with four countries having public 
debt exceeding 100% of their GDP (Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal). 
19 In the case of Asian countries, the central bank discount rate will be shown, but in the case 
of EURO countries, it is pointless, as it is the European Central Bank that sets the interest rate 
(at the end of 2011 it was 1.75%).
20 Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain.
67Monetary Integration in Europe and Asia and Economic Crises
Such a level of public debt may be unsustainable, as problems with lend-
ing money on the market arise. In this case Germany, benefiting from such 
a system, may support its southern friends. But is this possible in Asia?
ASIAN MONETARY INTEGRATION?
Asian financial and monetary integration was intensified in the aftermath 
of the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–1998, proving the underdeveloped 
financial market volatile and unprepared for bearing speculating attacks. 
The crisis spread from Thailand to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and South Korea. International financial institutions (mostly the IMF) fo-
cused on domestic (or East Asian) sources of the crisis, such as ill judg-
ment of banks and other financial institutions, a speculative bubble on 













Austria 350 3.5 –2.6 72.2 2.95
Belgium 414 3.5 –3.9 98 3.93
Finland 194 3.3 –0.6 49.2 2.68
France 2214 2.3 –5.3 86.1 3.43
Germany 3114 2.5 –1 80.6 3.94
Greece 294 3.3 –9.6 165.3 7.15
Ireland 187 2.6 –12.8 108.2 3.81
Italy 1847 2.9 –4 120.1 4.6
Luxembourg 41 3.4 –0.9 17.4 NA
Netherlands 701 2.3 –4.7 65.1 3.18
Portugal 249 3.7 –4.3 107.8 5.71
Spain 1406 3.1 –8.7 68.5 8.09
* Commercial banks’ prime lending rates
Source: The CIA World Factbook 2012 (most data from 2011), at: www.cia.gov
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the real estate and share market, crony capitalism (collusion of govern-
ments and the business sphere), or inappropriately managed exchanged 
rates (currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar) and rather high current account 
deficits. Other sources, such as speculative capital, were marginalized.21 
Early initiatives of creating an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997 were 
abandoned due to the pressure of the U.S. government, raising the risk 
of moral hazard in crisis-affected countries.22 But the crisis became a cat-
alyst for regional financial integration, based on three initiatives: the Chi-
ang Mai Initiative (within ASEAN+3, i.e. 10 ASEAN countries and 
the People’s Republic of China, Japan and South Korea) signed in 2000, 
a series of bilateral swap arrangements, and the Asian Bond Market Ini-
tiative in 2002 (which was followed by the creation of the Asian Bond 
Fund) also in Chiang Mai.23 Crucial developments were the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization (2010), pooling the reserves of 120 billion 
USD, and the subsequent creation of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Re-
search Office (AMRO) in 2011.24
Measures taken after the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–1998 were 
definitely one of the sources of East Asian countries’ relatively soft landing 
in the current economic crisis, but it seems that underdeveloped (or more 
weakly developed in comparison to the U.S. or Europe) financial markets 
played an important role as well.25
Shall the next step be the creation of a common currency? At the pre-
sent stage it is doubtful, considering the Optimum Currency Area theo-
ry and European experiences. Keeping in mind the financial integration 
of 13 East Asian countries (ASEAN+3), these countries were selected for 
analysis.
21 Martin Khor, The Economic Crisis in East Asia: Causes, Effects, Lessons, http://siteresourc-
es.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/malaysia/khor.pdf Web. Nov. 15, 2012.
22 Phillipe Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal,” Stanford Journal of East Asian 
Affairs, 3 (1), 2003.
23 Ming Wan, The Political Economy of East Asia: Striving for Wealth and Power, Washington: 
CQ Press, 2008, pp. 307–309.
24 See Chalongphob Sussangkarn, “The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, De-
velopment and Outlook,” ADBI Working Paper Series, 230, 2010 and John Ciorciari, “Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization,” Asian Survey, 51 (5), 2011.
25 Masahiro Kawai, “Global Financial Crisis and Implications for ASEAN,” in: Global Finan-
cial Crisis: Implications for ASEAN, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, pp. 3–5.

























Chart 3. Share of countries in Gross Regional Product (ASEAN+3)
Source: The author’s own research, based on data from CIA World Factbook 2012













Brunei 21 2 14.3 NA 5.5
Burma/Myanmar 83 5 –4.5 NA 9.95
Cambodia 34 5.5 –5.1 NA 5.25
China (PRC) 11300 5.5 –1.2 43.5 2.25
Indonesia 1125 5.4 –1.2 24.1 6.37
Japan 4444 –0.3 –9.7 205.5 0.3
Laos 17 7.6 –1.8 49.1 4.3
Malaysia 464 3.2 –4.9 51.8 3
Philippines 391 4.7 –2.1 50.9 3.8
Singapore 315 5.2 1.3 118.2 NA
South Korea 1554 4 1.5 33.6 1.5
Thailand 602 3.8 –1.5 44.9 3.25
Vietnam 300 18.7 –2.6 48.8 13
* Central bank discount rate
Source: The CIA World Factbook 2012 (most data from 2011), at: www.cia.gov
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Table 4 depicts basic data in reference to “European” convergence cri-
teria. At this stage convergence seems relatively difficult, although most 
of the analyzed Asian countries, paradoxically, fulfill public debt criteria. 
What is also a paradox is that the richest economies of this group, namely 
Singapore and Japan, have an immense level of public debt – Japan has 
a debt of more than 200% of GDP.
As a discussion of the creation of a currency area should also refer 
to possible supporters and benefactors of such a solution, Chart 2 depicts 
the relative strength of 13 analyzed economies. It is worth remembering 
that discussions of the creation of a currency block in Asia have usual-
ly referred to the creation of a yen block,26 whereas due to the strength 
of the Chinese economy, one should focus more on a possible yuan block. 
It is difficult to imagine a yuan (RMB) block at the moment, since the yuan 
must still become a fully convertible and international currency. There 
is another pragmatic factor: the Japanese yen is a strong currency and may 
be compared to the German Mark (DM), hence Japan would benefit a lot 
in the region (as it would benefit from fixed exchange rates, increasing its 
export) and in the world (as it would benefit from a weaker “regional yen” 
– comparison to EURO). Contradictorily, the Chinese yuan is perceived 
as an undervalued currency, serving as a tool for increasing Chinese com-
petitiveness on the international market, therefore there are no economic 
reasons for China to force the creation of a yuan block.
CONCLUSION
The Optimum Currency Area theory, introduced by Robert Mundell 
in 1961 and slightly modified by him and other scholars in subsequent 
years, is still crucial for analyzing international monetary integration. 
Mundell’s works (not only his work of 1961) give reliable hints on how 
to manage the process and on the possible risks that should be avoided. 
26 Colm Kearney, Calm Muckley, “Reassessing the Evidence of an Emerging Yen Block in North 
and Southeast Asia,” IIIS Discussion Paper, 41, 2004.
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There is no doubt that the EURO-12 or EURO-17 is not an optimum cur-
rency area, not only because of not fulfilling convergence criteria, but also 
because of the lack of political will for further implementation of adapta-
tion mechanisms, including important fiscal transfers from countries ben-
efiting from monetary integration to those losing on the process. 
Apart from technical criteria and theoretical background, we should 
also take pragmatic, sectoral interests into account. There are economies 
that may benefit more from economic integration, and we should not 
blame them for economic crisis. In terms of benefiting from the introduc-
tion of the Euro, the German economy is doing much better than others, 
but we should also bear in mind that it is not due to a purely technical 
process. What is also important is the fact that most countries do not fulfill 
convergence criteria and lasting monetary union in Europe, which proves 
that political will seems to be more important than technical nuances. 
It generally confirms the assumption that countries with strong currencies, 
usually based on strong economic foundations and high marginal produc-
tivity of production factors, benefit much more from a common currency 
than others.
Having the aforementioned in mind, we may observe that a certain 
level of financial and monetary integration prevents ASEAN Plus Three 
(or, more broadly speaking, Asian) countries from some risks embedded 
in economic crises (including speculating attacks on national currencies), 
but there are definitely more obstacles to overcome before this idea may 
be implemented. Firstly, it is almost impossible to imagine full mobility 
of the labor force in Asia, due to the dramatic differences in the economic 
development of these countries. Secondly, it is difficult to build a set 
of criteria that the 13 Asian countries may even partly fulfill in order 
to create a monetary union (and thus converge their economies in or-
der to avoid asymmetric shocks). Thirdly, the country that could ben-
efit the most, Japan, is not strong enough (including soft power taken 
from the attractiveness of its economic model – as it has been in crisis 
for the last 20 years) to encourage others to join. China would not ben-
efit enough economically (it would benefit politically, but it would also 
be a problem). Fourthly, there is a lack of political will, especially among 
crucial actors.
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Therefore, we should not expect a fast creation of an Asian Monetary 
Union. On the other hand, we should remember that financial integration 
has so far been enough to make the region more resistant to economic 
twists and turns. Having this in mind, Asian economies may think about 
further financial and monetary integration, especially if the European 
Monetary Union survives the current crisis. If so, the Asian Monetary Un-
ion may be created in the next 30 years (around 2040).
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